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WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
In an earlier part of this article 1 a translation of the rules of
frolic and detour and independent contractor into administration
of risk concepts was attempted. The case of the person to
whom the loss was allocated was considered to ascertain what
his capacity was to administer it. The analysis undertaken
there will be extended here to some of the partnership and
business trust problems. The capacity of the persons being held
liable to administer the risks allocated to them will be studied.
Contract as well as tort liability will be included. But only
those problems will be analyzed which involve the determina-
tion of what persons are vicariously liable for contracts and
torts admittedly within the scope of the business being under-
taken. Questions of the scope of the authority or power of the
so-called agent will not be included.
II
PARTNERSHIP
If A and B are co-owners of a business, in the sense that they
share profits equally, have each made the same contribution to
capital, hold the property used in the business in common and
share jointly in the management, they aie beyond doubt part-
ners. If they borrow $10,000 from C for a year and agree to
pay C one-fourth of the net profits of the business for the term
of the loan, the question of C's liability for the torts and con-
tracts of A and B may be put in issue. It quite naturally arises
in the query, are A, B and C partners?
It is legal history that C at one time would have been liable
as a matter of law in most jurisdictions.2 It is also legal history
that an emasculation process set in. Some of the phases of that
1 This is the second and concluding instalment of Douglas, Vicarious
Liability and Administration of Risk I (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 584.
2 Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. B. 235 (1793); ROWLEY, PARTNERISHI' (1916)
§ 51 et seq. A strong indictment against this rule is set forth in Eastman
v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1872).
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process might be stated, well known as they are. If C had been
given a right to a sum equal to one-fourth of the net profits,
liability would not follow as a matter of lav:2 If C had been
given the share of net profits as compensation for services, such
liability would not follow.4 By statute at least one state decreed
that such liability would not be imposed if the net profits were
to be received in lieu of rather than in addition to interest.5
Mlany cases began to draw distinctions where the arrangement
was more clearly earmarked as a security device, arranged
between debtor and creditor,6 and a sharing of gross receipts
was sometimes made an exception.- These unsubstantial dis-
tinctions were maintained in some jurisdictions though Cox v.
Hickiiw i is reputed to have changed the rule of We.vgh v. Ce.r-
ver and established a different test.0 Its actual holding will be
considered at length later. A reading of the opinions of the
Lords in the case reveals that different language was being used;
that a new articulation was being attempted; and that a new
analysis was under way. Some of the opinions in that case were
flavored with the concept "principal and agent." 21 Subsequent
opinions followed the mode. Was there a reciprocal agency?
Were the parties jointly interested in the business? These and
variations of them were sometimes expressed directly and indi-
rectly under the guise of "intention"-did the parties by what
they did express an intention to be partners? 11 Subsequently
came the Uniform Partnership Act stating: "A partnership is
an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit." - These are the terms in which the apolo-
giae of judges are being dressed. What holdings are they used
to describe? It is. singularly significant that the evolution of
this branch of the law has produced no test that is definite; that
in spite of the innumerable rulings it is difficult to assert with
any finality the factual variations which create a partnership.
However all is not chaos. One test has been devised which not
only quite adequately squares the decisions since Cox v. Hickriaiz,
3 See Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. 471 (N. Y. 1851).
4 Burckle v. Eckhart, 1 Denio 337 (N. Y. 1845).
Wessels & Co. v. Weiss & Co., 166 Pa. 490, 31 Atl. 247 (1895).
Richardson v. Hughitt, '76 N. Y. 55 (1879) ; Cassidy v. Hall, 97 N. Y.
159 (1884).
- See Dry v. Boswell, 1 Camp. 329 (1808).
8 8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860).
9 Rowimr, op. cit. supra note 2, § 43 et scq. For the evolution of the
English law see LINDLEY, PA rNER5HIP (9th ed. 1924) 57 et scq.
1o See the opinions of Lord Cranworth (pp. 303-306) and Lord Wensley-
dale (pp. 311-314).
"I Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435 (1872).
'12 UNrFoR PATNERSHiP AcT, § 6 (1). The English Act, 53 & 54 Vicr.
c. 39, § (1), provides: "Partnership is the relation which subsists
between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit."
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but also furnishes an acceptable rationale for them. It is the
entrepreneur theory of liability. Since much that is to follow
proceeds from the basis on which that theory rests, a statement
of it seems necessary.
This test was borrowed from the fields of principal and agent,
and master and servant. The rules of vicarious liability found
were rationalized on the ground that these losses which were
being allocated to the enterpriser were cost items which the
business should bear. They were hazards which the business
incurred. If they were treated as cost items, the consumer
of the product would ultimately pay them as they would
normally be passed on to him. It was reasoned that these were
costs which the consumer should pay; that it was difficult to
differentiate between these items and any other cost items. It
was concluded that no one enterprise was discriminated against;
that all members of a competitive group were treated alike; that
a premium was put on efficiency. This was the rationale of the
negligence cases in master and servant and the undisclosed prin-
cipal cases in principal and agent. 13  The transition to the
question, who is liable as a partner, was not great. In frolic and
detour, the enterprise and the enterpriser were known. The
problem was largely one of determining what the cost items were
to be. In the independent contractor cases the identity of the
enterprise to be held liable had to be ascertained. In the part-
nership cases here involved the limits of the enterprise are fixed
and certain. The only question is, who are the enterprisers?
Though the three problems have those differences they all rest
on the basis that the enterpriser is the one to whom these types
of losses should be allocated.
So the problem resolved itself into a search for the co-enter-
prisers in the partnership cases. To ascertain who the co-en-
terprisers were the following dual process was used.1 In the
first place a voluntary association of the alleged enterprisers was
necessary. This was deemed essential in view of the common-
law stress on" the consensual relation. An agreement between
the alleged enterprisers to act together was a sine qua non.15
It would change three separate enterprisers into three co-enter-
prisers. Once it was clear that various parties had associated
together the next step was to ascertain if those who had become
associated were in fact co-enterprisers. An analysis was made
of the facts in each case. This was effected by use of the four
earmark test of control, ownership, profits and losses. (1) Con-
13 A similar statement is contained in the earlier article. See Douglas,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 585 et seq.
14A statement of this analysis is to be found in (1922) 22 COL. L. REV.
576.
15 The landmarks on the point are Hoare v. Dawes, 1 Dougl. 371 (1180);
Burnett v. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344 (1879); Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
trol. The ability to formulate and to execute policies, i. c., to
make decisions in respect to the production or marketing func-
tions. (2) Ownership. The legal (or equitable) title to the
property used in the performance of the production or marketing
functions. (3) Profits. The chance to receive monetary gain
by sharing in the net income of the business. (4) Losses. The
investment which is staked on the success of the venture. The
agreement which the parties had made would normally reveal
the way in which these various incidents or earmarks had been
allocated. The allocation necessary to constitute co-enterprisers
would be a sharing of a major number of these earmarks in
addition to the agreement to associate. If there had been an allo-
cation to all of them of the four earmarks, they would undoubt-
edly be enterprisers, and, having agreed to act together,
co-enterprisers. Hence they should be liable. If those sought
to be held liable as partners had been allocated but one of the
four earmarks they obviously would not have the differentiating
earmarks of enterprisers. Consequently they should not be
liable. If they had but two of the four earmarks and had agreed
to associate, they would approach more closely the description
of co-enterprisers. But he who had the burden of establishing
that they were co-enterprisers had obviously failed since he had
not established it by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence
no liability should follow. It would be established that they
were co-enterprisers and liability would follow if instead of
having one or two earmarks, they had three of the four ear-
marks, and had agreed to associate. By a preponderance of the
evidence it would appear that they were co-enterprisers.
This test on the whole explained the cases quite well. Those
who had become associated together and shared the four ear-
marks obviously would be liable.', Those who, though associated,
had but one of the earmarks were not held liable. 7 Similarly
129, 7 Atl. 295 (1886). Consistently with this the UNIFOR5 PRThES5P
AcT, § 18 (g) provides: "No person can become a member of a partnership
without the consent of all the partners."
16 It would be impossible to satisfy more fully the requirements of the
UNirop-m PARTNERSHiP ACT, § 6 (1): "A partnership is an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
17 Boston Co. v. Smith, 13 R. I. 27 (1880) is representative. Liggett v.
Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272 (1874), and similar, cases adhering to the rule of
Waugh v. Carver, supra note 2, are of course contra. Mlollwo, 'March &
Co. v. Court of Wards, ntpra note 11, could be analyzed under the entrepre-
neur test as follows: the Rajah shared profits as he was to be paid a
fraction of the net profits ,ntil his claims were repaid. This is sharing
profits as an entrepreneur shares them. He did not bear losses as his
agreement was to forbear suit and not to release. He was not a co-owner
with the Watsons though he was an equitable mortgagee. The interests
of mortgagor and mortgagee are different. Co-ownership would imply
the same type of interest. Thus the most the Rajah could have would be
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for those who had but two of the earmarks even though an
association could be found.'8 But when an association was
present and three of the four earmarks, liability was normally
imposed.1 9 Though such theory of liability was not articulated
by the courts, nor clearly recognized in the opinions, it squared
the decisions quite well. And it furnished a rationale consistent
with the apologiae of the judges.20  And it did more than that.
It afforded an acceptable, workable economic basis for a liability
rule.
The following analysis proceeds on that basis. It is submitted
that such entrepreneur theory of partnership liability is by far
the best that has been suggested. It rests on sound bases. The
only criticism is in its application. It is this. As stated, the
enterprisers are sought because they are in a position to effectu-
ate a distribution of the losses allocated to them among the con-
sumers of the product. It is admitted that those who are full-
fledged entrepreneurs have that capacity. But it is not agreed
profits and control. And control is exceedingly doubtful since in no realistic
sense does he share in policy formulation. His only control is negative.
He may veto, but only veto. He and the Watsons do not share the same
type of control. And the type the Rajah had is not an entrepreneur's
type. Therefore it seems as if the Rajah had but one earmark-profit
sharing. The case therefore seems correctly decided.
Is Cox v. Hickman, supra note 8. In this case the cestuis were associated
as evidenced by the fact that they joined in the deed of arrangement and
made provisions for meetings for the exercise of the control reserved.
They had the loss earmark as each released his claim against the Smiths.
They shared control as they were vested with full supervision over the
trustees and could make rules as to the mode of conducting the business.
They did not share profits as entrepreneurs share profits, as they could
only be repaid the amount of their respective claims. They were not
co-owners though each had an equitable interest under the trust, since
the interest of each was so diverse from the interest of the other. The
similarity and permanency in tenure needed was lacking. In Parker v.
Fergus, 43 Ill. 437 (1867), the person sharing in profits and losses was
not held liable.
19 Buford v. Lewis, 87 Ark. 412, 112 S. W. 963 (1908). There Lewis was
sharing profits. The loss earmark seems present since advances were made
haob covered by the mortgage. While he entrusted his associate with
"the entire management and control of the business" it seems as if he
had the right at any time to share in policy formulation.
20 "Co-enterpriser" is a fit substitute for "co-principal," and "enterpriser"
for "principal." In Malvern Nat. Bank v. Halliday, 195 Iowa 734, 739, 192
N. W. 843, 846 (1923), the entrepreneur test was more clearly articulated
than in any other opinion which has been found. The court said: "The
salient features of an ordinary partnership are (1) a community of interest
in profits and losses (2) a community of interest in the capital employed
and (3) a community of power in administration. These are the primary
tests and constitute the indicia of the existence of a partnership." Rarely
is it so well put. It is usually hidden in the connotations of principal
and agent.
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that an allocation of any of the three earmarks gives those who
have them such capacity. In other words the entrepreneur test
is a test that descriptively differentiates those who are enter-
prisers from those who are not. It does not necessarily differ-
entiate those who have the capacities of enterprisers from those
who do not have such capacities. Or to be more precise, the
entrepreneur theory does not per se have the quality of measur-
ing the capacity of individuals to absorb the losses allocated to
them. The existence of that capacity is the premise from which
the theory proceeds. But in its application it overlooks its pur-
pose. In its eagerness to differentiate the entrepreneur from the
capitalist, wage earner etc., it has adopted a test which has made
such differentiation but which is not always compatible ,ith a
capacity test. It is with a capacity test that we are primarily
concerned.
That capacity is measured by the ability to distribute these
newly added cost items through the channels which the respec-
tive businesses provide. It is circumscribed by the ability to
shift and distribute risks. As indicated in the earlier part of
this article21 risk shifting describes the process of transferring
immediately to another the risk of a certain disadvantageous
event happening. This is normally done through the insurance
device. Risk distribution is on the other hand a phase of risk
assumption. The risk of the event is assumed and protection
against it is secured in advance by the creation of a surplus or
reserve. Or instead of being secured in advance it may be as-
sumed without such security and if a; loss occurs on the hap-
pening of the event, the loss will be absorbed by being distrib-
uted along with all other cost items.
There are but few instances where risk shifting devices are
available in modern society. Those are tort cases. The forms of
liability insurance are the devices available. No comparable de-
vice appears in the contract cases. While an employer may
shift the risk of liability for his truck drivers' negligence, he
cannot shift the risk of liability for his salesmen's improvident,
unwise, unauthorized contracts. There is no device for effecting
the shift. But in the tort cases where the risk shifting devices
are available the problem arises, what persons should the court
hold liable as partners if it were interested in holding liable those
who stood in a strategic position to shift the risk? Obviously
cognizance that a risk exists and access to an insurance market
would each be a sie qua, non. But no detailed analysis of what
would constitute such cognizance is necessary since no problem
21 See Douglas, op. cit. supral note 1, at 588. A translation of these
various rules of liability into risk avoidance and risk prevention concepts
has been arbitrarily excluded from this paper. It is not thought that
they are wholly unimportant.
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of risk shifting is separate from the problem of risk distribution.
This is true since it costs money to shift risks. Hence with each
shifting of risks there is inseparably bound up a problem of dis-
tributing the cost of shifting. So no matter whether a $5000
tort judgment, or a $5,000 contract judgment, or the cost of shift-
ing the risk of the $5000 tort judgment is involved, the problem
of distribution of losses is present. Thus the problem reduces
itself to an analysis of the earmarks not of co-entrepreneurs but
of those who have the capacity to do what co-entrepreneurs can
do-i.e., distribute the risks.
If full-fledged co-enterprisers know that a certain loss is
going to be allocated to them, they can build up a reserve
to handle it in advance. If they have been forced to pay without
having built up a reserve to cover the loss, they can recoup the
loss in the same manner in which the reserve was constituted.
That would seem theoretically possible in one of two ways or in
a combination of the two. (1) The price of the commodity
sold could be increased so that there would be an increased profit.
The increase would be approximated to the loss. Thus the re-
serve would be constituted, or the recoupment be effected. (2)
The increased profit could be secured by decreasing other costs
so as to get a greater differential between cost and price. Here
also the increase would make up the reserve or be the source of
recoupment. Thus in either case the absorption of these losses
allocated to the enterprisers would be effected by a manipulation
of this profit differential. In that way would the consumer bear
the loss ultimately. In no other way would it be reallocated from
the enterprisers to the consumers, for if the enterprisers had
paid out of their funds a $5000 judgment the absorption desired
would not be effected by merely making the consumers pay an
increased price. 'They might well pay an increased price and
still fail to absorb the loss in any realistic sense. For unless the
enterprisers are reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenditure,
the loss will be allocated to them and not to the consumers. And
it seems quite clear that the most obvious manner in which a re-
imbursement can be effected is through the use of this profit
differential. Hence it is around the manipulation of this profit
differential that the analysis of the capacity of enterprisers to
distribute risks centers. Therefore the capacity of anyone other
than an enterpriser to distribute risks would be determined
largely by such analysis. In other words such analysis would
reveal those who were constituted as effective, efficient risk dis-
tributors.
A technique is necessary for such analysis. The entrepreneur
test is of only partial aid in furnishing one. Obviously whether
a person has staked money or property in an enterprise, and
consequently has the loss earmark, throws little light on his
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capacity as a risk distributor. He well might have that capacity
with or without the loss earmark. Likewise the ownership ear-
mark per se has little utility for such purpose. Those who have
equitable title or legal title are not necessarily endowed with an
ability to distribute risks. They might have such ability with-
out title. Title per se can be discarded. The loss and ownership
earmarks for this analysis are of little utility. There may be
cases where they are of utility in finding the risk distributor, as
for example when the facts are muddy and it is hard to find the
way in which the various incidents or earmarks were allocated.
Then the presence of the loss and/or ownership earmark might
be of some evidentiary weight in determining that the allocation
was one way rather than the other. But when the facts are clear
and the precise allocation is known they can be ignored.2
It is apparent from what has been said that the profit earmark
and the control earmark cannot be so summarily treated. Re-
ceipt of profits has a direct relation to the reimbursement that
is necessary for effective risk distribution. Control necessary to
manipulate effectively the profit differential seems essential. A
consideration of the weight to be given each is therefore quite
necessary.
Control is a vague concept because it is so all inclusive. It in-
cludes many types. Each type may have a different significance
from the viewpoint of risk distribution. Hence it seems desir-
able to discard control as such and make the analysis in terms of
types of control. One type of use in effecting the distribution
desired is the right to fix prices. This follows from the conclu-
sion that price fixing is one method of manipulating the profit
differential. The only other type at all relevant is the right to
determine the various cost items, since such regulation may re-
sult in increasing the profit differential. All other types seem
quite immaterial in measuring the capacity of a risk distributor,
since no other type increases that capacity.
Profit sharing is likewise not wholly free from ambiguities.
It means different things. It may merely signify a right to
demand payment of a sum certain-rent, interest, consideration
for sale of property, etc.-out of a specific fund, i.e., net profits.
Or again it may mean a right to a definite fraction of this indefi-
22 Ownership of course might be significant in many ways. Since it
sometimes connotes beneficial use it might mean the right to profits. Or
again it might be translated into losses and mean that an investment had
been staked. And again it might signify control in any or all of the
ordinary meanings of the term, if the right to possession and use is
implied. Ownership would not be discarded. As much cannot be said for
losses. Sometimes-but not always-persons who stake a sum in a venture
have the profit and control earmarks. In a given case where all the facts
are not present the presence of the loss earmark might suffice to send the
case to the jury.
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nite fund called net profits for or during a specified period, which
may be a month, a year, ten years, until a debt is repaid, and so
on. The latter type of profit sharing is considerably more signifi-
cant than the former. In the first place it might be observed that
the latter type is the type which differentiates enterprisers. It
is the type which entitles the sharer to fortuitous, unforeseen
profits. Or, more analytically, the sharer is not restricted to
reimbursement for a particular amount which he has advanced
to the enterprise. In the former an increase in the profits one
thousand fold will mean no added increment to him. He takes
his $50 or $10,000 and that is all. Consequently it would seem
that the strict profit sharing earmark is the only type needing
consideration in this analysis of the capacity of risk distributors.
The case then resolves itself into a consideration of the two
types of control and the one type of profit sharing. What com-
bination or combinations give the capacity needed? The right
to share in profits as such is obviously not sufficient. No assur-
ance is present that any manipulation of the profit differential
can be effected. The ancient profit sharing test along with any
profit sharing test can therefore be dismissed without more ado.23
The right to fix prices by itself is likewise ineffective. While
that may result in increased net returns, it permits no sharing
in that increase. In absence of such sharing there would seem
tb be no doubt that that person or group of persons were not
risk distributors.24 And though the right to fix prices were
coupled with the right to share in the profits as such, it is doubt-
ful if effective risk distribution would result. The theoretical
difficulty is less apparent than a practical one. While in theory
an increased profit will result from an increased price, actually
it may not. Whether or not it does depends upon the state of
the market including the demand and supply as well as its com-
petitive or monopolistic features. Consequently though prices
are increased profits may remain,static or may decrease. The
existence of these variables makes it exceedingly difficult to say
that those who can fix the prices and who are entitled to the
profits stand in a strategic position to reallocate the losses which
they have been forced to assume. Much weaker is the case
23 This squares with decisions like Boston Co. v. Smith, supra note 17,
which hold that the profit earmark alone is insufficient. Sharing in gross
receipts alone is likewise insufficient from this viewpoint. An increase in
gross income is not assured. An allocation to the consumer is impossible
without some type of control. UNIFORM PARTNEUSHiP AcT, § 7 (3) decrees
no liability. The cases are in accord. Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 7
N. W. 785 (1881); Eastman v. Clark, supra note 2; Thomas v. Springer,
134 App. Div. 640, 119 N. Y. Supp. 460 (2d Dep't 1900). Contra: Cham-
pion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 175 (N. Y. 1837).
24 No such case has been found. From the analogy of the next group of
cases liability would certainly not be imposed.
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where profits as such are shared but the right to fix the prices
is contingent, for the contingency may never happen. To phrase
a general rule so as to make those persons vicariously liable in
either case for the losses incidental to the business would be to
hold those who were not clearly effective risk distributors. The
cases quite consistently refuse to impose such liability. - By such
refusal the holdings are in line with the approach here suggested.
If in addition to sharing profits as such they have not only the
right to fix prices but also the right to determine all costs it
would seem that they should be liable, if this approach is taken.
If any group can effect an absorption of losses that group can.
The ineffectiveness in the preceding case has disappeared. The
presence of the right to determine all cost items makes an effec-
tive manipulation of the profit differential as certain as possible
in a dynamic society. While no absorption can be absolutely pre-
dicted and while the whole notion is purely relative due to the
variations in the group being held, the business involved and the
business cycle at hand, it can be safely asserted that the combina-
tion of these three rights gives the possessors the essential char-
acteristics of risk distributors. The cases hold liable such per-
sons as partners. -  Those holdings are as consistent with this
analysis as are those which hold liable the full-fledged enter-
prisers.
This leaves a more difficult question, is each of the three
rights specified a size quv aoiz? Several in-between cases can be
eliminated forthwith. If the person or group sued shares profits
as such and only has the right to advise and confer with those
who have the right to fix prices and determine all cost items, it
is obvious that the capacity necessary is lacldng. No effective
check on price fixing and cost determination is at hand. On
these facts courts quite uniformly refuse to make the person or
persons designated vicariously liable for the contracts and torts
2 5 Kelly v. Scotto, 42 L. T. R. (N. s.) 827 (1880); Bradley v. Ely, 24
Ind. App. 2, 56 N. E. 44 (1900); Ccdarberg v. Guernsey, 12 S. D. 77, 80
N. W. 159 (1899); Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319 (1876). WThitnc-y
v. Ludington, 17 Wis. 140 (1863) is apparently contra. The liability of
one who had in addition to the profit earmark a contingent right to fix
prices was involved in Bleck & Co. v. Soeffing, 241 Ill. App. 40 (1926).
Liability was not imposed. The case was decided under the Uniform Part-
nership Act.
The right to share in gross rcceipts and also to fix prices would likewise
be insufficient. The assurance that gross income will increase is lacking.
Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Neil, 62 N. J. L. 462, 41 Atl. 834 (1S98) is some
authority that no liability would be imposed in such case. The right to
share in price fixing was there limited to only a few (though no doubt
the major) items.2 0 Spaulding v. Stubbings, 86 Wis. 255, 56 N. W. 469 (1893), where the
profit earmark was present and full control was exercised though the
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of those conducting the business.27 This result is reached though
the right to advise and confer is exercised, as long as it falls
short of participation in price fixing and cost determination.'s
These holdings square themselves with this rationale.
Where the right to share in profits as such is coupled with a
right of veto of an inclusive nature, a stronger case it put. But
right to exercise it does not appear in the agreement given. Buford v.
Lewis, supra note 19, where the prcfit earmark was present and no control
was exercised though presumably the right to do so existed. The capacity
to distribute losses would seem to exist whichever was true. A more recent
case is Wright Co. v. Green, 196 N. C. 197, 145 S. E. 16 (1928), where
profit sharing was stipulated and sharing in policy formulation seemed
tacitly provided for.
The latest case found is San Joaquin Light and Power Corporation v.
Costaloupes, 274 Pac. 84 (Cal. App. 1929), holding C vicariously liable as a
co-partner of A and B for a contract claim. A and B owned and operated
a cheese factory. They were indebted to C in an amount over $20,000,
secured for the most part by note and mortgage. They were desirous of
borrowing $15,000 more. Accordingly A, B and C entered into a written
agreement. It was provided that A and B were to ship and consign to C
all cheese manufactured; that C was to sell the cheese at the market price
in as large quantities as consistent with market conditions; that A and B
were to continue to manufacture unless it was agreed between the three
that market conditions did not justify further manufacture; that (C should
make all collections and deposit the money in a bank; thab C was to ad-
vance $15,000; that C was was to render stated accounts of income and
expenses; that A and B were to render regular accounts of expenses; that
all expenses of manufacture, storage and sale were to be paid by checks
drawn by A and one D, representing C; that certain salaries were to be
paid to A and B and D, C's representative; that after payment of all ex-
penses, the surplus was to be divided equally between A and B and C; that
the agreement should continue one year during which time A and B need
pay no interest on the money advanced by C; that all money advanced was
to be repaid by A and B. It appeared to be the intention of the parties to
have D, as C's representative, share in the management of the manufactur-
ing process. It also appeared that D, as C's representative, was actively
engaged in operating the factory in conjunction with A and B. The court
said: "In the business venture involved there were two branches, as is
necessary in all like undertakings, namely, manufacture and sale. In each
of these branches the association and control of Tsarnas (C) was
provided for. The selling end was exclusively under his control and dis-
cretion and the manufacturing end was under the joint control of the
Costaloupes (A and B) and the representative of Tsarnas (D)." Sharing
in profits plus control over all cost items and the right to determine prices
were present. Losses and co-ownership were absent. While liability would
not be imposed under the entrepreneur theory it would be under this test.
Surely A has the capacity of an effective risk distributor.
27 Thillman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64, 33 Atl. 485 (1895); Dean v. Harris,
33 L. T. R. (N. s.) 639 (1875). In Wagner v. Buttles, 151 Wis. 668, 139
N. W. 425 (1913), in addition to the right to advise was a sharing of gross
receipts. King & Co. v. Whichelow, 64 L. J. Q. B. 801 (1895). In none of
these cases was liability imposed.
28Dean v. Harris, supra note 27.
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even so, it is not strong enough to entail liability if this rationale
is followed. A right to veto prices fixed or costs which have been
determined upon is at its best a clumsy device for getting into
force any policy desired. For practical purposes it probably even
falls short of a backhanded way of fixing prices or determining
costs. Theoretically a thousand nays might be as effective as one
yea. Actually business is not and could not be run that way.
The use to which such veto can best be put, and for which it is
devised, is as a check over improvident judgments, unwarranted
acts, flagrant abuses of trust, etc. As a day-to-day business
regulator it fails. One would expect, if this approach were taken,
decisions holding such persons not liable as partners. The cases
so hold.29 And the authority is eminent.
Instances where sharing profits as such is coupled with the
right to terminate the business,:- or the right to designate some
one to keep books and watch outgo,:" or the right to inspect the
books and records, 3- or the right to countersign checks or make
deposits,3 3 etc. or any combination of such rights are obviously
not instances where liability should be imposed. Those typs
of control do not give the possessor any effective check on the
channels through which the distribution is to take place. The
cases, therefore, quite justly refuse to allow a recovery against
those persons. 4
29 Foremost of these cases is Mollwo, March & Co. v. Court of Wardo,
supra note 11. The latest is Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77
(1927), decided under the Uniform Partnership Act. The right to be
advised and consulted was also reserved in the latter case. Qualified veto
power in addition to profit sharing appeared in the following cases: King
& Co. v. Whichelow, supra note 27; Cassidy v. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159 (1881).
In Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Neil, s:p 'a note 25, there was a sharing of
gross receipts instead of profit sharing, and the right to consult on certain
matters and the right to fix prices of a limitcd number of articles. In
none of these cases was liability imposed.
30 Cedarberg v. Guernsey, supra note 25.
31 Holmes v. Old Colony Railroad Corp., 5 Gray 58 (Mass. 1855).
32 Cole v. Rome Savings Bank, 96 Misc. 188, 161 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup.
Ct. 1916); Boston Co. v. Smith, supra note 17; First Nat. Bank v. Hall,
150 Pa. 466, 24 Atl. 665 (1892); Thillman v. Benton, szipra note 27.
33 Parker v. Fergus, szpra note 18; Bleck & Co. v. Soeffing, cupia note 25.
31 Cedarberg v. Guernsey, supra note 25; Holmcs v. Old Colony Railroad
Corp., supra note 31; Cole v. Rome Savings Bank, supra note 32; Boston
Co. v. Smith, supra note 17; First Nat. Bank v. Hall, szpra note 32; Thill-
man v. Benton, supra note 27; Parker v. Fergus, sztpra note 18; Bleck & Co.
v. Soeffing, svpra note 25. Contra: Merrall v. Dobbins, 169 Pa. 480, 32 Atl.
578 (1895), where the person seeking to escape liability had the right to
designate a person to keep the books and act as cashier, receive all money,
deposit it in his own name and make all payments, and also the right
to annul the agreement upon 24 hours' notice and assume sole and exclusive
possession. Practically the same combination of types of control is present
in Parker v. Fergus, supra note 18, and liability was not imposed there.
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If the right to share in profits as such is coupled with a right
to fix only some of the prices and/or to determine only part of
the costs, the case would seem to turn on whether or not in the
particular case regulation of those prices or costs would be tan-
tamount to regulation of all prices and costs in so far as the re-
sulting effect on the profit differential were concerned. The lead-
ing case on the point was recently decided under the Uniform
Partnership Act. A owned a cannery equipped for canning vege-
tables. A agreed to grant to B the exclusive right to sell all A's
canned goods for a season. B agreed to endeavor to sell them and
make collections for those sold. For such services B was entitled
to a certain commission on gross sales. B agreed to furnish, if
requested, all necessary cans, cases and labels for packing and to
advance sufficient sums from time to time to pay for raw vege-
tables purchased and to pay the weekly pay rolls. A agreed to
repay to B all such sums advanced. A agreed to pay B one-half
of the net profits resulting from the season's operation of the
cannery. B was given the right to determine the salaries and
wages to be paid and if the pay roll did not meet with his ap-
proval, then he need not make any advances until it did meet
with his approval. B's liability was sought as a partner with A
for goods sold and delivered during the term of the contract be-
tween A and B. The court ruled that B was a partner of A and
therefore was liable for the claim.3 5
The profit earmark is present. The right to fix the prices is
The case of Johnson Bros. v. Carter & Co., 120 Iowa 355, 94 N. W. 850
(1903) is not thought to be contra to the general view. The profit sharer
held liable as a partner agreed to furnish a man to keep the books and
"oversee" the work. The man designated kept the books and also trans-
acted all th& business of buying supplies and handling funds. The
defendant also seemed to be actively engaged in phases of the work. So
it seems as if the defendant was sharing in policy formulation indirectly
through his tool, the bookkeeper, and directly through his own activity.
No liability is normally imposed though the right to designate someone
to keep the books is coupled with a sharing of gross receipts. McDonnell
v. Battle House Co., 67 Ala. 90 (1880).
In Hackney Co. v. Robert E. Lee Hotel, 156 Tenn. 243, 300 S. NV. 1
(1927), recently decided under the Uniform Partnership Act, the lessor
and lessee were held not to be partners where in addition to a specified
rent charge the lessor was entitled to one-half of the net profits and
reserved the following control: a limitation upon the lessee's personal use
of the rooms in the hotel was made; the lessee was required to give his
personal attention to the management and not to substitute another without
the lessor's written consent; a daily statement of rooms occupied and a
daily as well as a monthly statement of the business in addition to an
auditor's annual statement was required; the lessee's account had to be
carried at a specified bank; the hotel had to be operated on a cash basis;
the lease would be forfeited on thirty days' notice for failure to comply
with the terms imposed or to pay the stipulated rent.
- Southern Can Co. v. Sayler, 152 Md. 303, 136 Atl. 624 (1927).
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present. The right to determine some, but not all of the costs,
is present. Is there enough regulation over these cost items so
as to enable B to manipulate effectively the profit differential?
It is submitted that there is. The cost items to be determined
directly by B are the amounts of salaries and wages and, contin-
gently, the amounts to be paid for cans, cases and labels. He
was not given ,direct regulation of any other cost items, for ex-
ample-price to be paid for coal, price to be paid for vegetables
to be canned. Yet the regulation of the cost items specified gave
him strategic control over the entire production. He could stop
all output or increase it to maximum. Though he could not
specify the prices to be paid for vegetables, as a practical matter
he could probably prevent the purchasing of these perishable
products by his control over the money supply and the produc-
tion process. This latter may be somewhat tenuous and insuffi-
cient by itself; yet, coupled with the right to determine labor
cost, it gave him effective regulation of substantially all the
variable cost items. Thus B, having an effective regulation over
the variable cost items and having the right to fix prices and
to share profits, seems to have had the capacity to distribute
losses. Under the theory advanced the court should hold as it
did. This case is of peculiar significance not only because there
are few like it but also because it was decided under the Uniform
Partnership Act. At least one decision is giving to "co-owners"
a profit and control meaning. In doing so it adapts itself pe-
culiarly well to the rationale here suggested.
As mentioned, such a case is rare. The other comparable cases
are hardly analogous. The right to fix some of the prices coupled
with a right to fix some of the costs might possibly be sufficient.
But in the cases in which they have appeared they have not
seemed to give to the possessor effective manipulation of the
profit differentialYG And it would take an unusually strong case
to allow a partnership liability to be imposed on one whose only
control was a regulation of some of the cost items, for the same
reason that price fixing alone would be quite inadequate.
This analysis and the cases so far discussed imply that the
right to share in profits coupled with the rights to fix substan-
tially the prices and to determine substantially the cost items are
each a sine qzia %on to effective risk distribution. That would
explain admirably Cox v. Hickman.37 There the defendants had
26 In Bradley v. Ely, supra note 25, the lessor of the farm in addition to
sharing in the profits had the right to share in fixing the sales price of
the produce and in determining the purchase price of stoc]l In Austin,
Nichols & Co. v. Neil, su'pra note 25, the lessor of the hotel was sharing
in gross receipts and jointly with the lessee fixed the price for rooms and
board. In addition a strong veto power over wages was given to the lezzor.
37 Supra note 8.
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formerly been creditors of the Smiths but, on not being paid, took
charge of the business through a device somewhat comparable to
a creditors' committee. The Smiths transferred the property to
trustees in trust for the defendants until the claims were paid,
and then in trust for the Smiths. The defendants released their
claims. They were entitled to all the profits until their claims
were paid. A majority in value of these creditors had the "full
power for the general benefit of the creditors to give any direc-
tions . . . 'for the present or future management'" of the
business. They were held not liable for a claim accruing while
the business was being run by the trustees. It will be readily
observed however that they had by virtue of their inclusive con-
trol over the trustees the right to fix prices and to determine all
cost items. On the other hand they did not have the strict profit
earmark. No matter what increase in profits, each defendant
would take the amount of his original claim and no more. Hence
it would follow that no reimbursement could be effected from
the fund of increased profits. Consequently they would not be
effective distributors of these losses. Is true profit sharing a
sine qua non to liability?
A, the owner of a business, for benevolent reasons, assigns to B
all of his net profits for one year. One of the truck drivers while
delivering goods negligently injures P who sues A. No partner-
ship question is involved. But a problem is involved which rests
on precisely the same basis. It could be argued that A should
be held under any such risk distribution rationale as here ad-
vanced, even though he lacks the profit earmark. The reason
would be that A on the facts stands in a strategic position to dis-
tribute the losses. To be sure to effect a reallocation to the con-
sumers A must have a means of reimbursement. He has it. By
virtue of his all inclusive types of control he can determine what
the cost items are to be. If he pays a $5000 judgment he can
make that a cost item. That certainly grants him the right to
withdraw from the gross receipts the $5000 which he has paid.
TJnder those facts he needs no profit earmark. Theoretically he
needs no more than the right to determine what the cost items
are to be and to be reimbursed out of the assets. Actually he
needs more than that if the loss is to be reallocated to the con-
sumer. If he does not have the right to increase by the amount
of his liabilities the gross receipts-differential, there will be no
assurance that the loss will not be allocated directly to him by
being paid out of capital or to the profit sharer by being paid
out of profits. To effect the reallocation desired it would seem
necessary that he have the right to fix prices and the right to
regulate all cost items. Having those types of control A is in a
strategic position to manipulate effectively the gross receipts-
differential and to be reimbursed out of the increase of that fund.
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Similarly, any group of persons who shared such types of con-
trol would have co-enterprisers' capacities to distribute the
losses. Profit sharing would not be essential. That is not to say
that sharing profits as such would never be a size qua nn. If
the right to determine costs did not include the right to make
the liability in question a cost item, and to get reimbursement
from the assets, profit sharing in the strict sense would be a size
qva. non. For it would provide the channel for reimbursement.
To state the result more directly, the right to be reimbursed is
a sine qua non. At times that will make necessary the true profit
earmark. Thus in Southern Can Co. v. Sayler,25 the profit ear-
mark seems essential. The control over cost items was not all-
inclusive. It was restricted to only a few. The right to dictate
the addition of items not mentioned is absent. That means that
the only source of reimbursement will be the net profits. With-
out such earmark the case might well go the other way.
But the same cannot be said for Cox z,. Hickmzan.. It does seem
as if the defendants in that case actually were vested with as
much control as A had in the hypothetical case. The trustees
were their instrumentalities. They could give the trustees direc-
tions for the operation of the business. This right was subject
to no qualification. It seems quite clear, therefore, that they
could determine all cost items, that they could make themselves
creditors for amounts which they might expend, that they could
manipulate the gross receipts-differential and from those re-
turns be reimbursed. While this may not be beyond all doubt,
it seems necessary to make this assumption in order to dispose
of the case with finality. But even so the case need not be de-
cided differently. Each of the partnership cases before the
courts has probably been a pathological case. The business is
insolvent. All talk of the particular defendants actually dis-
tributing the losses and reallocating them to the consumers may
be fiction. The respective businesses before the court may not be
effective absorbents. Few insolvent businesses are. The justi-
fication, however, of the rationale of risk distribution is that the
rule of law is made not only for the pathological case before the
court but for the general run of business. Therefore the rule of
law which is fashioned should be correlated to the relatively
normal rather than to the relatively abnormal type-fact situa-
38 Supra note 35. Under the entrepreneur test this case vould seem to
go the other way. The profit and control earmarks are present. The
agreement to repay all advances removes the loss earmark, and there was
no co-ownership of property. The fact that B was given a lien upon all
goods packed at the cannery as security for his advance does not establish
a co-ownership in the same interest. Just as there is no eo-ownerzhip
between mortgagor and mortgagee so there is none between lienor and
lienee. Association, profits and control under the entreprencur test would
-be insufficient.
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tion with which it deals. Through the medium of a pathological
case a rule is made for cases that are not pathological. In Cox
v. Hickman there is a pathological case. But when the type-fact
situation there involved is placed in its normal environment it
does not change. It remains pathological. The business taken
over and operated by creditors is usually in a bad way. If insol-
vency is not present, it is imminent. It is a known fact that
creditors do not resort to this liquidating device unless the enter-
prise is in a precarious position.- If the losses are to be ab-
sorbed and reallocated to the consumers, the reallocation must
be effected not only through an insolvent medium but a medium
which promises to remain insolvent during the transient control
of the creditors. It is unlikely that if the cestuis in Cox v. Riok-
narn were saddled with a $5000 judgment they could effect a
reallocation. They are in charge of the business because their
own claims have not been paid. If, they are held liable, their
claims against the business will be increased. The fact that the
income has not been sufficient to pay their own claims makes it
quite unlikely'that it can be increased to take care of these addi-
tional items. In other words if the cestuis were made liable, the
chances are that the loss would be allocated, not to a medium
which could effect a reallocation to the consumers, but to a me-
dium which would have to absorb it within itself. There may be
exceptions. Thus there might be a case of an insolvent but go-
ing concern with creditors in full control. If that were the fact
situation present in Cox v. Hickman, the rationale suggested
would not explain the holding. But the general rule of law
should not be made for such exceptional cases.
On the other hand it might be argued that, following the pre-
ceding analysis, a similar rule of law might be made for all
pathological cases. All insolvent business units lacking such ab-
sorbent qualities might be dealt with alike. Thus before the
creditors take charge of the insolvent business, and after they
relinquish their control and turn it back to the debtor in an in-
solvent condition, the pathological nature of the case may be
said not to have changed. The business unit at hand may be in
no realistic sense an effective absorbent immediately before, dur-
ing, or immediately after the creditors' regime. Even so the case
of creditors is materially different from the case of the insolvent
entrepreneur. Creditors step into the picture when insolvency
has arrived. The opportunity to build up the reserves to take
care of the losses is not available. That opportunity would exist
in the solvent stages of the business, but at no time have the
creditors been in control of a medium through which absorption
can be effected. The strategic position which the original entre-
so Cf. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 1133-
1162.
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preneur had in respect to providing for the losses is lacking.
The case for liability of the creditors is weaker by comparison.
As of the insolvent period the entrepreneur may not be an effec-
tive absorbent. Before insolvency set in he was. At no time
were the creditors. That factor accentuates the pathological na-
ture of the case of the creditors. It also emphasizes that insol-
vency should not relieve the entrepreneur under the rationale
advanced. His capacity to administer this particular loss should
be determined not solely by his capacity when insolvent. His
capacity to administer the risk of this particular loss rather than
his capacity to administer this particular loss should be meas-
ured. The former capacity is measurably greater than the lat-
ter. To be sure, the judgment will allocate the loss to him and
he will no doubt be unable to reallocate it to the consumers. But
he and others like him had the opportunity to create a reserve
good against the risk of loss in question. The fact that they
were unskilled, inefficient, or unintelligent, and did not provide
for it is no extenuating factor. A rule which makes allowance
for the efficient and conforms itself to their capacities may be
said to rest on good policy.
There is a further reason for distinguishing between the credi-
tors in control and the insolvent enterpriser and for making a
different rule for each. It is the absence of the true profit ear-
mark in the former and its presence in the latter. While it is
true that the presence of the profit earmark is not essential for
the purpose of creating the capacity to distribute risks, it is im-
portant for another purpose. That purpose is compensation for
risk bearing. As previously stated, the capacity to distribute
risks is relative and not absolute. The reason is patent. De-
mand, supply, competition, the business cycle, etc. are variables
that deny at times the existence of that capacity. The risk that
the capacity will not or does not exist is therefore real. The
presence of such risk is not sufficient, as indicated above, to deny
the validity of the premise on which this rationale rests. But it
is of sufficient importance to be recognized. Its presence means
that the person or group of persons to whom the court allocates
the loss may have to absorb the loss without effecting a realloca-
tion. Some compensation for bearing that risk should be pres-
ent. The full-fledged entrepreneur receives his compensation in
his right to the profits. Genuine co-enterprisers receive their
compensation in their profit earmark.4 " The creditors in Cox v.
Hickman receive no such compensation. If they are held liable,
they are forced to bear the risk of not being able to distribute
the losses allocated to them without being recompensed for tak-,
ing that risk. The factor is particularly accentuated in view of
the extieme pathological nature of the case. While the profit
40 Cf. 2 BoUCKE, PRINCIPLES OF ECoNouCS (1925) 152 et seq.
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earmark may disappear as a sine qua non to effective risk dis-
tribution, it reappears as a sine qua non to liability for a differ-
ent reason. The case where profits are completely separated
from full control is rare. The hypothetical case given is not
known. Liability might well be imposed under the rationale
advanced, but denied because of the absence of, compensation,
in the form of the profit earmark, for the risk assumed. Though
that case may be doubtful because of the minimized risk due to the
solvent condition of the business, Cox v. Hickman is beyond
doubt. The risk looms up large. It is substantial. If compensa-
tion for risk bearing is needed in any case, it is in that case. The
problem then in any case, where full control is present and the
profit earmark is absent, is to weigh the capacity to distribute
risks as against the absence of compensation for assuming the
risk of not being able to do so. In respect to a solvent, going
concern, there might be reasonable differences of opinion. In
respect tQ the insolvent, pathological case at hand in Cox v. Hick-
man, the absence of both factors seems to put the case beyond
doubt. For these various reasons Cox v. Hickman can be sus-
tained. And it is singularly significant that almost without ex-
ception, both before and after the Uniform Partnership Act, the
courts when making rules for the same or analogous type-fact
situations have followed Cox v. Hickman.41
So much for the insolvent entrepreneur and the creditors in
control of an insolvent business. But the case of the debtor
41 Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover, 7 N. D. 460, 75 N. W. 911
(1898); Davis v. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 1102 (1887); In re
Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922). The last case was decided
under the Uniform Partnership Act. Creditors of a badly involved broker-
age firm took charge of the business. The assets of the firm were trans-
ferred to a new firm which assumed the debts. The creditors agreed with
the members of the new firm that the latter were to continue the business;
that a managing committee of creditors be designated. with "full power
to supervise and control" the business until the indebtedness be paid off;
that the right of the partners of the firm to carry on and manage the
business be subject to the supervision and control of such committee; that
in case of disagreement the determination of the managing committee be
final; and that the net earnings be applied to pay off the claims. The
members of the new firm were adjudged bankrupts. A petition to vacate
was filed on the ground that these creditors were also partners of the
members of the firm adjudged bankrupts and that there was no insolvency
as a result. An order dismissing the petition was affirmed.
Purvis v. Butler, 87 Mich. 248, 49 N. W. 564 (1891) seems contra,
though the state of the business taken over and managed by the creditors
does not appear. Presumptively it seems on all fours with the preceding
cases. Righter v. Farrel, 134 Pa. 482, 19 Atl. 687 (1890) is hardly contra
since the creditors took over the business completely, later became partners
in it and did business as such. This may be the case of an insolvent,
going concern which is an effective absorbent. Conceivably that was also
the situation in Purvis v. Butler, supra.
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whose business is commandeered by his creditors is obviously
different. For claims arising during the term of creditors' con-
trol he should not be liable. To be sure he has the true profit
earmark since fortuitous, unusual profits will redound to his
benefit. But during the term of creditors' control he does not
share in policy formulation in any sense nor supervise or control
in any way those who are formulating policies. When all such
control disappears the sine quw. non of effective risk distribution
disappears also. And there is authority that liability would not
be imposed. 2
III
JOINT STOCK COMPANY AND BUSINESS TRUST
If the preceding analysis is applied to the cases involving the
liability of members of a joint stock company and of cestuis of
a business trust for claims incurred in the operation of the busi-
ness, one fact variation will be noticed immediately. Those be-
ing sued are not the managers in the colloquial sense. The man-
agers are the directors of the joint stock company and the
trustees of the business trust. Those sued have only a super-
visoT type of control. They do not formulate policies as part-
ners normally do. They merely supervise those woir formulate
policies. The degree of supervision depends on the types of con-
trol reserved. It is around these types that the analysis centers.
The purpose will be to weight these various types according to the
degree in which they endow those who may exercise them with
the capacity to distribute the losses in issue.
The mere fact that this control may be residual or supervisory
does not deny it factual strength for the purpose at hand. The
members of a joint stock company elect directors. They deter-
mine the tenure of office. While they do not have the right to
formulate policies, and hence can not as a matter of right directly
fix prices and determine costs, they can elect as managers those
who will formulate the desired policies. Furthermore, having
elected their representatives their hands are not tied if the poli-
cies desired are not forthcoming. Those elected can be removed
and more obedient representatives can be substituted.4 3 Thus
42Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover, stipra note 41. The court said
at 473: "The instrument placed the control of the property and the busines
entirely beyond the assignor so long as the trust should continue."
43 The statutory restrictions on the right of shareholders to remove direc-
tors of a corporation do not apply here. The members and the directors
seem able to make any contract they wish. Removal with or without cause
would be permissible. This is consistent with NEW YORK GEN.AT
ASSOCiATiONS LAW, § 3 that, "The articles of association of a joint-
stock association may: ... (2) Prescribe the number of its directors,
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while the members of the joint stock company are one step re-
moved from the fixing of prices and the determination of costs,
they seem not so far removed as to become ineffective regulators
thereof. That, coupled with the fact that their claim to the
profits gives them beyond doubt a source of reimbursement, gives
them .the capacity to distribute losses as required by this
rationale. For these reasons the decisions seem consistent here-
with when the members are held liable as partners. 44  They not
only have co-enterprisers' capacities. They are co-enterprisers.1"
The business trust cases are more complicated. The compli-
cation arises because of the varied types of control allocated to
not less than three, to have the sole management of its affairs. (3) Contain
any other provision for the management of its affairs not inconsistent
with law." In New York it would not seem that a rule more strict than
that existing in respect to corporations, Matter of Schwartz, 119 Misc.
387, 196 N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1922), would be established. The
reservation in the articles of the right of the shareholders of a joint stock
company to remove the directors was implicitly approved, though not
involved, in Spraker v. Platt, 158 App. Div. 377, 387, 143 N. Y. Supp.
440, 447 (3d Dep't 1913), where the court said: "... we find no provision
of law prescribing the manner in which the directors shall be chosen, nor
limiting the right of a voluntary association to itself prescribe the method
of choosing directors, nor fixing a definite term of office . . ." There is
authority that the right exists in England. Isle of Wight Ry. Co. v.
Tahourdin, 25 Ch. D. 320 (1884); Browne v. La Trinidad, 37 Ch. D. 1
(187) ; 8 EDw. 7, c. 69, Sched. 1, No. 86 (1908); 1 LINDLEY, LAW or
ComPANIEs (6th ed. 1902) 418. The reservation in the articles of joint
stock associations of the right of shareholders to elect and remove, or elect
and supervise, the directors seems quite common. The indenture reserved
the right of election and removal to the shareholders in Carlen v. Drury,
1 V. & B. 154 (1812). The validity of the provision was tacitly approved
by Lord Eldon who dismissed a bill for a dissolution prayed for on the
grounds of mismanagement, because the redress furnished by the indenture
should have been tried first. In Harrison v. Heathorn, 6 Man. & G. 81
(1843), the deed of settlement gave to the shareholders the right to pre-
scribe all directions and regulations for the operation and management
of the property and to make any rules for the management which they
saw fit. Cf. Baird's Case, 5 Ch. App. 725, 734 (1870); Reffon Realty Co.
v. Adams Land & Bldg. Co., 128 Md. 656, 661, 98 At]. 199 (1916).
"4Carter v. Mcclure, 98 Tenn. 109, 38 S. W. 585 (1896) ; Cutler v. Estate
of Thomas, 25 Vt. 73 (1852); Ashley v. Dowling, 203 Mass. 311, 89 N. E.
434 (1909); cf. Hibbs v. Brown, 112 App. Div. 214, 98 N. Y. Supp. 353
(1st Dep't 1906). If the shareholders were shorn of all control the case
would go the other way under the approach here taken. Or if the control
reserved was ineffective for the purpose at hand, the result would be
different. No such abnormal cases involving the liability of shareholders
of a joint stock company have been found. The fact that they are joint
stock companies would not suffice, for as has been seen, supra note 43, in
absence of statute the shareholders' rights depend on contract and the
variations in contracts are many. If the allocation of control to the share-
holders is normal, the results indicated should follow.
45 Under the entrepreneur test liability would no doubt be imposed. The
element of association is always present as are the four earmarks.
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the cestuis. Where the cestuis have no control whatsoever over
the trustees (except that which a court of equity always gives
to every cestui) the majority hold that the cestuis are not per-
sonally liable.- Since the cestuis cannot as a matter of right
take a hand in fixing prices or determining costs they completely
lack the capacity, which full fledged co-enterprisers have, to
distribute losses. Their profit earmark is obviously insufficient,
as has been noted. Such holdings seem quite consistent with this
analysis. They are likewise consistent with the entrepreneur
test, where there has been no association. But under the risk
distribution theory an association would be of no significance
unless it was an association for the purpose of exercising the
types of control which this test weights. An association per se
might have signifiance for some purposes but certainly none
under this theory. Provisions for meetings at which the trustees
would read reports to the cestuis would be meaningless from the
angle of administration of risks4  Liability should not therefore
be imposed. The case for liability is clear where the cestuis have
been allocated rights to make rules for the conduct of the busi-
ness and to direct the trustees in any matter. The capacity of
cestuis in that case to distribute the losses is certainly as great
as that of the members of a joint stock company, for no doubt the
right to direct carries with it by implication the right to enforce
the direction. To impose liability is to conform to the theory
presented. s
The intervening cases fall into three groups with the cestuis
being allocated three different sets of rights: (1) the right to
fill vacancies among the trustees; (2) the right to elect trustees
annually; (3) the right to elect trustees, to remove trustees
4 Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W. 602 (1923); Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 At. 273 (191G);
Mayo v. Moritz, 151 Mass. 481, 24 N. E. 1083 (1890). Though the liability
of the cestuis to third persons was not involved in the following cases
they are some authority for the point. Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1,
102 N. E. 355 (1913); Bouchard v. First Pcople's Trust Co., 253 Mass.
351, 148 N. E. 895 (1925). Contra: Thompson v. Schmitt1 115 Tex. 53,
274 S. W. 554 (1925).
47Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co., 239 S. W. 1001 (Tex. 1922) is
such a case. Liability was imposed. The holding is consi,-tnt with
Thompson v. Schmitt, supra note 46. Technically there was an association
since the cestuis not only adopted the declaration of trust at a mneting
held for that purpose but thereby made provision for the other meetings.
The entrepreneur test would probably impose liability since in addition to
this association there were the profit, loss and ownership earmarks in the
cestuis. Cf. Magruder, The Position of Sharcholdcrs in BusinCs3 Trlwts
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 423, 428, 431; Rowley, The Influence of Control in
the Determination of Partnership Liability (1928) 2G Micu. L. Rcv. 290,
296.
48 Morehead v. Greenville Exchange Nat. Bank, 243 S. W. 540 (Tex.
1922).
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and/or to alter and amend the trust indenture. The last is ob-
viously sufficient for the purpose desired. It is even broader than
the control which the members of a joint stock company have,
for by virtue of the right to amend the cestuis continually stand
on the threshold of policy formulation. At any time they can
not only oust the management but constitute themselves the 'man-
agement. Such authority as there is imposes liability." Even
the right to amend the articles might suffice. With that right the
cestuis could strip the trustees of all control or regulate it as
they wished. In fact they could no doubt become the policy for-
mulators leaving the trustees as holders of naked legal title.
That right would equip them with a capacity to distribute losses
which would be at all times a potentiality if not an actuality.
There is some authority that liability would be imposed."
Cases where only the right to elect trustees and to remove them
exists seem not to have been litigated. But if they arose it would
seem apparent that, following this approach and observing the
joint stock company analogy, liability would be imposed. The
cestuis would then stand in a strategic position to formulate the
policies desired through their subservient instrumentalities, the
trustees.41 The first case is hardly doubtful. The type of con-
trol is very tenuous. The right may never be exerciseable since
there may never be a vacancy. Not only is the right subject to
49 Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 106 N. E. 1009 (1914); Horgan v.
Morgan, 233 Mass. 381, 124 N. E. 32 (1919). The position is taken in
Magruder, op. cit. supra note 47, at 434-435, that the power to remove in
these cases should not suffice as long as this right had not been exercised
so as to interfere with and assume control of the business.
&0 Simson v. Klipstein, 262 Fed. 823 (D. N, J. 1920); McCarney v.
Hollister Oil Co., 241 S. W. 689 (Tex. 1922). The Simson case is weak
since it involved not the question of the liability of the cestuis but the
question of the necessity of joining the cestuis as parties plaintiff in an
action against third persons for breach of contract. The sole question
involved would seem to be, to whom did the promise run? That raises the
question whether the name of the association, in which name the contract
was signed, was the name of the trustees or the name of the cestuis.
Obviously that has nothing to do with the question of vicarious liability.
The McCarney case is weak because following Thompson v. Schmitt, supra
note 46, liability would be imposed though no control was allocated to the
cestuis. The position is taken in Magruder, op. cit. supra note 46, at 437-
438, that liability should not be imposed.
1 If the right to remove was unqualified this result would follow. If
the right was qualified, it might not. Thus stockholders in corporations
are sometimes denied the right by statute to remove directors without
cause. If the declaration of trust or articles of association reserved to the
cestuis only the right to remove trustees for cause, the case would seem
to fall in the first of the three groups mentioned. "For cause" would not
include a difference in judgment. It would include only breach of faith,
etc. The trustees, as instrumentalities of the cestuis, would no longer
appear subservient.
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this contingency but the right as, if and when exercised is of
little potency in giving the cestuis the capacity desired. In the
first place it does not assure election of all or a majority of the
board. Secondly, once exercised no effective check is retained. The
authority, though weak, is consistent with this view and indicates
that no liability would follow.52 The second case is more trouble-
some. The right to elect all of the trustees annually is less
tenuous than in the preceding case. The constitution not only
of the majority but of the entire board can be regulated to a
degree. And some check is reserved, for if the policies desired
to be formulated are not, new representatives can be elected the
ensuing year. The check is more tenuous than the right to
remove; less tenuous than the right to fill vacancies. The prob-
lem is again one of weighting this type of control. Does it give
to the cestuis the capacity to keep an effective check on the
fixing of prices and the determination of costs? It seems as if
it does. If the selection were to be daily, the check would be
tantamount to the right to remove. A weekly and possibly a
monthly election would be the same. The interval for inde-
pendent, unregulated discretion which a year provides is, to be
sure, great. While the question is solely one of degree, the
possibility of a failure to re-elect at the end of the year coupled
with the fact that elected representatives are usually faithful
to those who elect them and mindful of their wishes seems to
give to the electors an effective check over policy formulation
during the year. This control would probably suffice under the
entrepreneur test to give the cestuis the control earmark and
coupled with the other three and the element of association as
evidenced by the provision for the annual meeting, make the
cestuis liable. They not only look like enterprisers. They have
the enterprisers' essential capacity. Liability should, therefore,
be imposed under this test. Though the case, is by no means
beyond doubt, there is authority that the type of control is suf-
52 Smith v. Anderson, 15 Ch. D. 247 (1880). The case involved an action
to have the property of an association distributed on the ground that the
association was illegal by virtue of a statute providing that no "company,
association, or partnership, consisting of more than twenty persanz shall
be formed . . . for the purpose of carrying on any other businss (than
banking) that has for its object the acquisition of gain... unless it is
registered." It was held for the defendant. The court said, intcr a!fc, at
280: "They (the cestuis) could not have been made liable on any contract
made by the trustees." In Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923), liability was imposed on the cestuis though the only type of control
reserved by the cestuis was the right to elect the "succezorz" of the
trustees. If the duration of the trustees' term of office was the life of
the trust, the case is contrary to the position here taken. What the
duration was is not revealed. The position is taken in Magruder, op. cit.
eupra note 47, at 436, that no liability should be imposed.
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ficient to entail liability5 3 Of course, no such problem arises
if the cestuis who are being sued are trustees. No matter how
tenuous their control is as cestuis their control as trustees over
policies would be present. Though the control as cestuis were
absent, their control as trustees would be absolute. The fact
that they might have one type of control as cestuis and another
as trustees would make no difference in their capacity to dis-
tribute the losses in issue. The cases quite consistently impose
liability in this case, in absence of a contract for limitedliability."
The cases which are not in accord with this analysis
and which cannot be aligned with the substantial majority
of the cases are not necessarily wrong or unsound.- They
would not fit into a logical system built around the rationale
which has been presented. The opinions may be out of line
with opinions in the partnership cases. But consistency is not
the sole aim of law. The theory of liability which this essay
advances does not embrace all stimuli that might induce courts
to hold a group of individuals vicariously liable. It embraces
only a few. There are others. The others cannot be fully
understood unless the whole economic and social environment
out of which the cases came are known. It may be that abuses
were being committed under these new forms. It may be that
they were merely susceptible of abuse. It is understandable if
a court felt that limited liability should be attained only by the
use of the devices specified by the legislature.", On the other
hand it is understandable if the legislature extends to cestuis
who have full control limited liability.57 The test here advanced
does not pretend to lay down a test that will lead to satisfactory
53 Rand v. Morse, supra note 52, is authority if the duration of the
trustees' term of office was one year. It is not a holding on the precise
point if the duration of the term was either the life of the trust or the
respective lives of the trustees. Even then, it is of some weight, for if
liability were imposed in that case it surely would be in the case in question.
But see Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924); Home
Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920). The former
case involved the liability of a trustee, not of the cestuis. The latter
involved the question of the authority of the association to sell its stock in
the state. The dicta are strong and unequivocal, however.
64 Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 136 N. E. 160 (1922); Howe v.
Wichita State Bank & Trust Co., 242 S. W. 1091 (Tex. 1922), aff'd, 115
Tex. 158, 274 S. W. 563 (1925), 278 S. W. 177 (1925).
55 Thompson v. Schmitt, supra note 46; Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-
Cable Co., supra note 47.
50 Undue emphasis given to what the court has said rather than to what
the court has .done may lead to exaggerated notions of the import of the
decisions. For an example see Hildebrand, Massachusetts Trust-A Sequel
(1925) 4 TEx. L. Ry. 57.
57 2 OXIA. GEN. LAWS (1921) §§ 8465-8468. The last section limits liabil-
ity to third persons to the trust res.
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adjustments between conflicting economic and social forces in
all cases. There may be stimuli which transcend all notions of
risk distribution.
Furthermore this test gives no absolute weight to the various
types of control. The type of control in question, though theo-
retically effective, may be actually ineffective for the purpose at
hand. One variable causing such impotence might be absentee
ownership. If that factor intruded, it might well be argued
that the shareholders ceased to have the essential capacity of
enterprisers, not only because they were in no position to super-
vise presently the formulators of policies, but also because they
were in no strategic position to acquire such capacity in the
future. One who of necessity votes by proxy, and does not have
it in his power to make intelligent judgments in respect to the
management, realistically does not have an effective check on
policies to be formulated. Not only is his control tenuous. For
all practical purposes it exists only when the essential nature
or quality of his economic interest is to be changed. He has
taken on the characteristics of the classical investor. He has
lost the capacities of the classical entrepreneur. Such variable
has not appeared in any of the cases of this type. If it did
appear, clearly and unequivocally, the case might well go the
other way on this rationale.
This analysis of the cases reveals remarkable uniformity in
the holdings. It is not pretended that this rationale finds articu-
lation in the opinions. It does however give to the control
concepts, with which the opinions and literature abound and
which have too often been assumed to have magical qualities,03
meaning and significance. Above all it attempts to furnish an
economic and social basis for a rule of vicarious liability and to
substitute for apologiae, at best inarticulate, an analysis that
at least attempts to relate the legal problem to its economic and
social environment. Such dynamic treatment does not conclude
that the decisions are wrong. It merely puts them on a basis
that makes possible a clearer articulation and a more careful
analysis of the issues.
58Cf. Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1103, 1120; Rowley, op. cit. -upra
note 47.
